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A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary
Rule: The Historical Error and The Comparative Myth
DONALD E. WILKES, JR.*
Introduction
"The great body of the law of evidence consists of rules that oper-
ate to exclude relevant evidence."' The most controversial of these
rules are those which prevent the admission of probative evidence
because of the irregular manner in which the evidence was obtained.
Depending on whether the method of obtaining violated a provision
of positive law, irregularly obtained evidence' may be separated
into two classes. Evidence obtained by methods which meet legal
requirements but contravene some moral or ethical principle is un-
fairly obtained evidence. Evidence obtained in violation of a legal
right or immunity is improperly obtained evidence, regardless of
whether moral standards also have been breached.
Depending on the authority of the person procuring it, improperly
obtained evidence may be grouped into two broad categories. The
first consists of evidence secured by agents of government and may
be divided into two subcategories: evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure
(illegally obtained evidence), and evidence obtained in violation of
the statutory or common law authority of the agent (unlawfully ob-
tained evidence). The second category consists of evidence procured
by a private party. This category also is composed of two subcatego-
ries: evidence obtained in violation of the criminal law, and evidence
obtained in violation of tort or contract law. Evidence improperly ob-
tained by a private party is wrongfully obtained evidence.3
There have never been any rules of evidence operating to exclude
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., 1965, J.D.
1969, University of Florida.
' C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 121 (2d ed. 1972).
2 For purposes of this article, irregularly obtained evidence includes only tangible
evidence (or testimony concerning the existence of such evidence) directly obtained by
irregular methods. The term does not refer to intangible evidence (such as oral commu-
nications) obtained irregularly, or to tangible evidence procured as an indirect result
of an irregular search and seizure.
3 The following diagram reflects the varieties of irregularly obtained evidence:
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Too often the debate over whether to admit irregularly obtained evidence is flawed
by the failure of disputants on both sides of the issue to distinguish the types of
irregularly obtained evidence. In this article a determined effort has been made to
differentiate the varieties of such evidence. It should be noted, however, that the judges
and authorities on evidence law quoted in the text of the article frequently fail to make
these distinctions.
unfairly obtained evidence.' Of the rules authorizing suppression of
improperly obtained evidence, the Exclusionary Rule is the best-
4"Seemingly no one has considered the contention that evidence legally obtained,
but obtained in contravention of some moral or ethical principle, is inadmissible, of
sufficient merit to warrant an allegation of error or a decision of a court whose reports
come down to us." 5 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 2075, at 3866 (2d ed. Henderson 1926).
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
known. The Exclusionary Rule regulates the use of evidence illegally
obtained under the federal Constitution. Under the Rule, evidence
obtained by violating federal constitutional protections against un-
reasonable search and seizure-that is, evidence seized by a govern-
ment agent in contravention of the fourth amendment-is inadmis-
sible in a court of law. Proclaimed for the first time in 1886 in a for-
feiture proceeding,5 extended to federal criminal trials in 1914 and
to state criminal trials in 1961, 7 the Exclusionary Rule, since its in-
ception, has been perhaps the most hotly debated of the many rules
of evidence which act to suppress the truth. While criticism of the
Rule is hardly new,8 it has become increasingly popular over the past
five years, and legal periodicals are plentifully supplied with current
articles advocating abolition9 or dilution" of the Rule or proposing
"alternatives."" This flurry of adverse commentary is the result of
the recent appearance of two influential attacks on the Rule. The first
of these was a 1970 law review article which condemned the Rule as
ineffectual in deterring police lawlessness.' 2 The second was the sca-
5Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'See, e.g., Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1939);
Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MIcH. L. REV. 749 (1933); Note,
Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 20 Ky. L.J. 358 (1932); Patterson, A Case
for Admitting in Evidence Liquor Illegally Seized, 3 ORE. L. REV. 334 (1924).
9 See, e.g., Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243 (1973).
'" See, e.g., Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation:
Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Imperative of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 21 (1975); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1027 (1974); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free Because the Constable Blunders?, 50
TEX. L. REV. 736 (1972).
" See, e.g., Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act-An Alternative to the Exclu-
sionary Rule?, 66 J. OF CRIM. L. & C. 1 (1975); Daviddow, Criminal Procedure Om-
budsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
317 (1973); Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights
Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1973); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclu-
sionary Rule-Can There Be an Effective Alternative?, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 91 (1972);
Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure: Examination and Prognosis,
20 KAN. L. REV. 768 (1972).
"Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970). Despite its formidable reputation, the objectivity of this article is open to
serious question. The author, Dallin H. Oaks, formerly a law professor at the Univer-
sity of Chicago and now president of Brigham Young University, is a confirmed oppo-
nent of the Exclusionary Rule and inclined to draw unwarranted conclusions from
incomplete or even dubious data. Moreover, preparation of his article was funded by
an organizational unit of the United States Department of Justice, which has pub-
licly favored abolition of the Exclusionary Rule. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1972, at 19,
col. 1.
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thing denunciation of the Rule made by Chief Justice Burger in his
dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics.'3 In his 16-page opinion the Chief Justice
blasted the Exclusionary Rule as "conceptually sterile"'" and urged
that it be replaced with an effective tort remedy against the govern-
ment employing the offending officer.
Caught unprepared for the surge of criticism, supporters of the
Exclusionary Rule have been slow in rallying to its defense. Recently,
however, two important law review articles have been published in
support of the Rule. One of the articles advances powerful arguments
in favor of the proposition that the Rule is constitutionally required.'"
The other article undertakes to prove from empirical data that the
Rule does deter the police from engaging in unconstitutional search
and seizure practices.'6
This Article, which represents still another defense of the Ex-
clusionary Rule, will examine the validity of several arguments
frequently raised by opponents of the Rule. Part I will explore the
Historical Argument. This argument, a favorite among critics of
the Rule, attacks the Rule on the ground that it is inconsistent with
practices of ancient vintage. Part II will assess the merits of the
Comparative Argument, which criticizes the Rule because it has not
been adopted in other countries which have a legal tradition similar
to that of the United States.
I. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
In opposition to the Exclusionary Rule, the argument is frequently
advanced that the Rule is inadvisable because its creation in 1886
marked a departure from traditional practices.' 7 This approach,
which may be denominated the Historical Argument, is neither more
nor less than an appeal to the wisdom of the past; it is a claim that
the Rule is undesirable because it conflicts with earlier and wiser
13 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Chief Justice has long opposed the Exclusionary Rule,
which he prefers to call "the Suppression Doctrine". Id. at 413. (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).
,1 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
'"Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
"Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974). See also Note, On the Limi-
tations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
'"See Way, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26 TENN. L. REV. 332, 336-
41 (1959).
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procedures. Although it is often invoked by critics of the Exclusionary
Rule'" and rarely challenged by supporters of the Rule,'9 the argument
could never be characterized as a strong one. After all, even if it were
true that promulgation of the Exclusionary Rule shattered a long-
established rule favoring admission of improperly obtained evidence,
this, without more, would hardly constitute grounds for discarding
the Rule. As Justice Holmes observed many years ago:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
2
1
But there is an even more cogent reason for rejecting the Histori-
cal Argument. The argument is erroneous not only because it postu-
lates that whatever is ancient is right, but also because it assumes
that long prior to creation of the Exclusionary Rule a rule of law had
been accepted under which improperly obtained evidence was admis-
sible. It is, of course, an undeniable historical fact that at common
law no rule existed which excluded improperly obtained evidence.
This, however, does not mean that the issue of the admissibility of
such evidence was resolved in favor of admission at an early date.
Until the nineteenth century, the issue virtually never arose; and the
absence of a common law rule of exclusion prior to then does not
prove that improperly obtained evidence was admissible; rather, it
simply indicates that the issue had not been passed upon.
Three rules operating to admit improperly obtained evidence were
already in existence when the Exclusionary Rule was propagated.
Two of the rules were of English origin; the third was American.
Contrary to what advocates of the Historical Argument would have
others believe, however, a recognition that these rules antedated the
Exclusionary Rule does not necessarily lend force to their argument.
Since the Historical Argument appeals to history, acknowledgment
that the three rules preceded the Exclusionary Rule bolsters the argu-
ment only if the earlier rules represented long-established practices.
Insofar as the earlier rules are concerned, therefore, the validity of the
"See, e.g., Note, On the Admissibility of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained, 136 Am.
St. Rept. 135 (1910).
"See, e.g., Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8 A.B.A.J. 646 (1922). See
also Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 13 MINN. L.
REv. 1 (1928); Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future,
53 VA. L. Rav. 1314 (1967).
"Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rav. 457, 469 (1897).
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Historical Argument depends not simply on whether they came first,
but on whether they preceded the Rule by a substantial amount of
time. More exactly, since the Exclusionary Rule was created in 1886,
the argument's validity turns on whether the rules of admissibility
originated significantly earlier than toward the end of the nineteenth
century. Careful examination of English and American case law
shows that they did not. Like the Exclusionary Rule, these rules were
nineteenth century inventions.
Subpart A of this Part will demonstrate that the so-called "com-
mon law rule" of admission for improperly obtained evidence did not
exist in England until around the beginning of the final quarter of the
nineteenth century, shortly before the origin of the Exclusionary
Rule. Similarly, Subpart B will demonstrate that the Rule made its
appearance a relatively short time after formulation of both the Eng-
lish rule admitting unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal case
and the early American rule admitting illegally obtained evidence.
Finally, Subpart C will suggest an explanation for the widespread
acceptance of the historical error on which the Historical Argument
is premised.
A
Before 1740 there was not a single reported case in England deal-
ing with the issue of whether to admit improperly obtained evi-
dence.2 ' As late as 1800 there was but one reported case involving the
issue.2 2 Until the nineteenth century, therefore, the English courts
practically never considered the admissibility of improperly obtained
evidence, and consequently the absence of a common law rule of
exclusion during this period cannot be interpreted to indicate that
such evidence was admissible. The issue simply had not arisen fre-
quently enough for the courts to resolve it one way or another. Insofar
as criminal cases are concerned, the absence of any early English
decisions on the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is not
difficult to understand. There are two reasons for this. First, prior to
the nineteenth century the mass of regulatory-type criminal statutes
utilized in populous and industrialized societies to proscribe activi-
ties deemed injurious to the public health, safety, and welfare did not
exist. This made it unlikely that substantial intrusions into individ-
ual privacy would be required when enforcing the criminal law. Sec-
ond, the absence of organized public police forces before 1829 severely
limited exercise of whatever powers of search and seizure the govern-
ment possessed.
During the nineteenth century, questions as to the admissibility
21 Bishop Atterbury's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 490 (H.L. 1723), is sometimes sug-
gested to have resolved the issue of the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence,
but in actuality it did not. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text infra.
2 Jordan v. Lewis, 93 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1740).
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of improperly obtained evidence arose more often than before, but
still infrequently. The cases in which the issue cropped up may be
summarized as follows. First, there was a handful of civil cases which
upheld the admissibility of such evidence when it had been obtained
by a private party. Between 1811 and 1827 one group of malicious
prosecution actions held that a copy of the indictment obtained with-
out the required permission of the court was admissible;2 in another
group of cases decided between 1842 and 1898, copies of privileged
documents improperly obtained were admitted;2 4 and, in a third
group of cases decided between 1842 and 1854, evidence obtained by
various improper methods was deemed admissible." Second, between
1807 and 1828 a cluster of civil cases upheld the admissibility of
written statements secured by bankruptcy commissioners who had
improperly interrogated a bankrupt." Third, two cases, one in 1826
and the other in 1870, determined that unlawfully obtained evidence
was admissible in a criminal trial.Y Finally, dicta in several mid-
century civil and criminal cases favored the use of improperly ob-
tained evidence. In Regina v. Leatham,2 for example, one judge an-
nounced: "It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would




These cases do not confirm a great age for the "common law rule."
Quite the contrary, the cases prove that prior to the latter part of the
nineteenth century-probably around 1875-the rule did not exist,
for it was not until then that holdings in a number of miscellaneous
cases coalesced into a general rule of admissibility for improperly
obtained evidence in civil and criminal cases. Since the "common law
rule" did not emerge in England until late in the last century, it
follows that the mere prior existence of the rule furnishes virtually no
support for the Historical Argument. The "common law rule" may
21 Caddy v. Barlow, 1 Man. & Ry. 275, 31 Rev. Rep. 325 (K.B. 1827); Legatt v.
Tollervey, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (K.B. 1811). See also Jordan v. Lewis, 93 Eng. Rep. 1072
(K.B. 1740).
24 Calcraft v. Guest, [1898] 1 Q.B. 759 (C.A.); Lloyd v. Mostyn, 152 Eng. Rep.
558 (Exch. Pleas. 1842). See also Lord Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469 (C.A.).
2 Phelps v. Drew, 118 Eng. Rep. 1203 (Q.B. 1854); Doe v. Date, 114 Eng. Rep.
641 (Q.B. 1842). See also Sowell v. Champion, 112 Eng. Rep. 156 (Q.B. 1838).
21 Robson v. Alexander, 1 Moo. & P. 448 (C.P. 1828); Stockfleth v. DeTastet, 171
Eng. Rep. 4 (K.B. 1814); Smith v. Beadnell, 170 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1807).
" Rex v. Derrington, 172 Eng. Rep. 189 (Assizes 1826); Jones v. Owens, 34 J.P.
759 (Q.B. 1870). See also Regina v. Pamenter, 12 Cox C.C. 177 (Assizes 1872); Regina
v. Granatelli, 7 St. Tr. (n.s.) 979 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1849).
8 Cox C.C. 498 (Q.B. 1861).
Id. at 501. But compare Regina v. Lushington, Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 Q.B.
420 (1893).
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have already existed in 1886 when the Exclusionary Rule first ap-
peared, but the earlier rule antedated the subsequent one by only a
few years. Thus, insofar as it attacks the Exclusionary Rule for having
departed from the "common law rule," the Historical Argument is
unfounded.
B
Proof that the "common law rule" of admissibility is a creature
of the nineteenth century does not necessarily mean that the Histori-
cal Argument is completely devoid of merit. The rule may be a rela-
tively recent derivation, but it is also true that in the nineteenth
century both England and the United States had two other rules
permitting the use of improperly obtained evidence. Both of these
rules governed evidence obtained in an improper manner by an agent
of government. The English rule authorized admission of unlawfully
obtained evidence in a criminal case; the American rule authorized
admission of illegally obtained evidence. If either of these rules had
been extant for a significant period of time before the Exclusionary
Rule originated, it might be maintained that the Historical Argument
retains some validity. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the for-
mulation of these two rules of admissiblity and to compare their
chronological development with that of the Exclusionary Rule.
It is not difficult to understand why the English courts have never
faced the question of whether illegally obtained evidence is admissi-
ble." England has no written constitution limiting the authority of
Parliament to pass laws or restricting the power of executive officials
to enforce those laws.3 ' As a consequence, evidence obtained by gov-
ernment agents who violate the privacy of citizens is never, properly
speaking, illegally obtained evidence. There can be no violation of the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
if no constitutional provisions exist to guarantee that right. Thus,
since the only legal restraints on governmental power are those im-
posed by statute or common law, evidence obtained in an improper
manner by an English government agent can be of only one
type-unlawfully obtained evidence.
According to critics of the Exclusionary Rule,32 the English rule
allowing introduction of evidence improperly obtained by a govern-
ment official originated in Bishop Atterbury's Case.? In that eigh-
10 But see King v. Regina, [19681 2 All E.R. 610 (P.C.) (Jamaica).
3 W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 259-79 (5th ed. 1959). See also A.
DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1965).
32 See, e.g., 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 2955 n. 1 (1905).
3 16 How. St. Tr. 490 (H. L. 1723).
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teenth century bill of pains and penalties proceeding, Francis
Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester, was sentenced by Parliament to re-
moval and disqualification from office and banishment for having
participated in a treasonable conspiracy against King George I." Un-
fortunately for devotees of the Historical Argument, however, there
are three reasons why Atterbury cannot be regarded as having
marked the initial appearance of the English rule permitting use of
unlawfully obtained evidence.
First, English and Commonwealth writers on the admissibility of
unlawfully obtained evidence omit any reference to the case in their
discussions of the origins of the English rule.
3 5
Second, the report of the proceedings on the bill in the House of
Lords discloses that at no time did Bishop Atterbury object to the
admission of evidence on grounds that it had been obtained by impro-
per means. It is true that after his arrest the Bishop presented a
petition to the House of Lords in which he complained that without
a warrant the deputy lieutenant of the Tower and two warders had
entered his room and unlawfully and forcibly searched his person
and belongings, consequently seizing several items .3 However, the
petition did not request exclusion of the seized items and appears to
have been a simple claim that the violence inflicted on the Bishop's
person was a breach of the privileges he enjoyed as a member of the
House of Lords, for which the guilty parties ought to be held account-
able.3 1 It is also true that a ruling of the House of Lords denied the
Bishop permission to interrogate a witness concerning whether
three supposedly intercepted letters, deciphered copies of which
were used against him, had been opened in accordance with the
procedures specified in the post office statute.3 This ruling, however,
was not a determination that evidence allegedly obtained in viola-
tion of an act of Parliament was admissible. Bishop Atterbury con-
tended that the alleged letters did not reflect reality and nis ques-
tions were aimed at proving that the letters never existed or were
forgeries or that they had been copied incorrectly by postal em-
ployees.3 9 The questions were not directed to the witness for the
34 The statute imposing this punishment is 9 Geo. 1, c. 17 (1723).
35 See, e.g., Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence (1), 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 603; G.
WILLIAMS, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER FOREIGN LAW-ENGLAND, IN POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 105 (Sowle ed. 1962); Williams, Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Means, 1955 CRIM. L. REV. 339; J. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND
PRACTICE 700-701 (38th ed. Butler & Mitchell 1973); 13 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND
640 (2d ed. Hailsham 1934).
-1 16 How. St. Tr. at 490-94.
3 Id.
Id. at 495-97. The postal statute was 9 Anne, c. 10 (1710).
16 How. St. Tr. at 495-96, 508-13, 533-34, 537-60. Apparently the mistaken view
that the Bishop was trying to exclude the copies of the letters because they had been
improperly obtained is derived from remarks made by counsel for the bill. Id. at 629-
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purpose of showing that the copies were inadmissible because they
had been improperly obtained.
Third, Atterbury was a bill of pains and penalties proceeding
instituted for the specific purpose of evading the two-witness rule
ordinarily applicable to treason cases.4" As such, it is hardly an ex-
ample of enlightened jurisprudence. Indeed, the case should be recog-
nized for exactly what it is: a politically motivated prosecution
brought in deliberate violation of the spirit of an important rule of
evidence, wholly undeserving of precedential value. Even assuming,
therefore, that Atterbury could be viewed as having upheld the ad-
missibility of unlawfully obtained evidence, it is doubtful that the
case would be sufficiently authoritative to create a general rule to
that effect. In fact, at least one critic of the Exclusionary Rule has
candidly acknowledged this.4 '
The English rule permitting use of unlawfully obtained evidence
did not, therefore, originate in Atterbury. Rather, the "rule was ac-
cepted during the nineteenth century in two cases of a somewhat low
order of authority."4 In the first of these cases, Rex v. Derrington,43
the defendant, while jailed on a burglary charge, gave a letter to the
turnkey after the latter promised to mail it. The turnkey instead gave
the letter to a magistrate, who in turn transmitted it to the prosecu-
tor. At trial, the defendant objected to the admissibility of the letter
on the grounds that it had been obtained "by the most gross violation
of all faith."" Holding that what a defendant says or writes is admis-
sible except when a confession is induced by threats or promises or
is privileged, the trial court overruled the objection.
Because the incriminating letter had been obtained by treachery
rather than physical trespass, Derrington was not a final determina-
tion that all unlawfully obtained evidence, including evidence seized
by invading the privacy of the defendant's person or property, was
admissible. That determination was not made until nearly a half-
It is worth noting that the techniques used to decipher the alleged letters were so
outlandish that the entire proceeding in the House of Lords was mercilessly lampooned
by Jonathan Swift. See J. SwIFr, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 114-15 (1952).
o Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 354 n. 73 (1939).
A bill of pains and penalties proceeding was identical to an attainder proceeding
except that the death penalty could not be inflicted upon conviction. See United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965).
4, Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 354 n. 73 (1939).
42 G. WILLIAMS, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER FOREIGN LAW ENGLAND, IN POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 105 (Sowle ed. 1962).
a 172 Eng. Rep. 189 (Assizes 1826). See also Regina v. Pamenter, 12 Cox C.C. 177
(Assizes 1872).
1 172 Eng. Rep. at 189 (Assizes 1826).
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century later in Jones v. Owens." The defendant was charged in a
court of petty sessions with possessing young salmon in violation of
a Victorian statute.46 Twenty-five young salmon had been discovered
in the defendant's pocket by a constable conducting an unlawful
search. Some of the salmon were offered in evidence by the constable,
and the defendant was convicted despite his contention that the evi-
dence was inadmissible because of the manner in which it had been
obtained. On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed over
the defendant's renewed objection that the evidence should have
been excluded. Although it was only two sentences long, the court's
opinion firmly established the rule that unlawfully obtained evidence
was admissible in a criminal case in England.
The American rule authorizing admission of illegally obtained
evidence is often asserted to have originated in 1841 with the case of
Commonwealth v. Dana.47 The objectionable evidence in Dana, how-
ever, had been obtained in conformity with the provisions of the state
declaration of rights prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure,
and therefore the language of the court's opinion indicating that ille-
gally obtained evidence was admissible was pure dicta. 8 The first
American case to hold on the merits that evidence obtained in viola-
tion of constitutional guarantees was nevertheless admissible was
State v. Flynn,49 decided seventeen years after Dana.
Is 34 J.P. 759 (Q.B. 1870).
One other case involving unlawfully obtained evidence deserves mention. In
Regina v. Granatelli, 7 St. Tr. (n.s.) 979 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1849), the defendant was
charged with fitting out a ship to be used against a friendly country. At trial an offi-
cial of a steamboat company declined, on self-incrimination grounds, to produce a
subpoened agreement between the company and the defendant whereby the former
contracted to sell two ships to the defendant. The claim of privilege being sustained,
the prosecution undertook to introduce testimonial evidence regarding the contents
of the agreement. The witness summoned to the stand was a clerk to the solicitors
for the prosecution. The witness had obtained access to the agreement under the
following circumstances: in an earlier proceeding the agreement had been delivered
to a magistrate in obedience to a request from the magistrate. Thereafter, an appli-
cation was made that the agreement be duty-stamped, and the agreement was taken
by a policeman for stamping. The witness had read the agreement while counting the
words in order to pay the proper duty.
Without explanation, the trial court overruled the defendant's motion that the
testimony be excluded because it was based on an improper obtaining of the agree-
ment. It is unclear, however, whether this ruling meant that the court supported the
proposition that unlawfully obtained evidence was admissible. The holding may sim-
ply have been that no improper seizure had occurred.
" 24 & 25 Vict., c. 109, § 15 (1861).
7 43 Mass. (2 Metcalf) 329 (1841).
'Dana is discussed below at notes 57-65 and accompanying text infra.
,1 36 N.H. 64 (1858).
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The Exclusionary Rule first appeared in Boyd v. United States0
in 1886. Boyd was a forfeiture proceeding in which the Court sus-
tained the claimants' contention that the trial court had erred in
permitting a customs invoice to be introduced into evidence. The
Court's judgment that the invoice was inadmissible rested on two
separate grounds. First, the invoice had been obtained from the
claimants by a court order which, in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, compelled them to produce it.51 Second, the compulsory pro-
duction of the invoice violated the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.2 Although Boyd has been criticized insofar as it
held that compulsory production of a document under judicial pro-
cess was equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure," there can
be no doubt that Boyd established, at least in regard to federal forfei-
ture proceedings, that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment was excludable. In 1914 the Court extended the Exclu-
sionary Rule to federal criminal trials,54 and it was made applicable
to state criminal trials in 1961.
In overview, therefore, the Historical Argument is fallacious to the
extent that it can be construed to mean that the Exclusionary Rule
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5' Id. at 621-22.
52 Id. at 630-35.
1 See, e.g., Nelson, Searches and Seizures: Boyd v. United States, 9 A.B.A.J. 773
(1923).
11 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Prior to the Weeks decision, several lower federal courts had extended the Boyd
Exclusionary Rule to criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Mounday, 208 F. 186
(D. Kan. 1913); United States v. Mills, 185 F.318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). See also United
States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1908). In 1899 another lower federal
court had extended the Exclusionary Rule to deportation proceedings. United States
v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899).
-" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
In 1960, shortly before the opinion in Mapp was announced, evidence obtained in
violation of state constitutional search and seizure provisions was, on the basis of state
law, inadmissible in a criminal case in the courts of 26 states. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
The first state court decision to exclude evidence because it had been obtained in
violation of state constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure
was State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 A. 1097 (1901). The evidence suppressed in Slamon
was an incriminating letter. Four years later, in State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 A. 37
(1905), the court refused to extend the Slamon rule to contraband. The second state
court decision to exclude evidence seized by violating the search and seizure provision
of the state constitution was State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903).
See also State v. Height, 127 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
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is "relatively modern"56 when compared to the English rule admitting
unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal case and the American
rule of admissibility for illegally obtained evidence. The English rule
was announced tentatively in the Derrington case in 1826 and made
definitive in the Jones decision in 1870. The American rule was first
articulated in dicta in the Dana opinion in 1841 and subsequently
established by the Flynn case in 1858. The Exclusionary Rule, on the
other hand, was promulgated in Boyd in 1886 and later extended to
federal and state criminal trials in 1914 and 1961 respectively. Thus,
while the English and American rules of admissiblity did originate
before the Exclusionary Rule, it is clear that the Rule came into
existence only a short time thereafter.
C
The Historical Argument cannot withstand scrutiny because it
erroneously assumes that the three rules allowing introduction of
improperly obtained evidence were much older than the Exclusionary
Rule. Despite this, the belief that the Rule promulgated in Boyd had
been preceded by contrary rules of long duration is widely held. In
order to explain the wide acceptance of this incorrect belief, one must
begin with an examination of Dana, the first reported American case
in which a defendant claimed that improperly obtained evidence was
excludable.
The defendant in Dana had been convicted in a Massachusetts
court for unlawfully possessing lottery tickets. The tickets, which
apparently had been issued under the authority of a Rhode Island
statute for the purpose of raising public school revenue there, had
been seized at the defendant's shop in Boston by a constable execut-
ing a search warrant. On appeal, the defendant's principal objection
to the admission of the tickets arose out of his claim that the search
warrant met neither the requirements of the provisions of the state
declaration of rights prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure nor
the statute authorizing issuance of search warrants.
5
1
Holding that the search warrant had complied with both constitu-
tional and statutory requirements, the court sustained the admission
of the tickets. 8 Before turning to the other issues in the case, however,
11 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 8 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
11 Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Metcalf) 329, 334-36 (1841). The defen-
dant also raised several technical objections to the seizure of the tickets, all of which
were rejected. Id. at 336-37.
11 Id. at 336.
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the court endeavored to fortify its determination that the tickets had
been properly introduced by adding this statement:
There is another conclusive answer to all these objections.
Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally
seized, still this is not legal objection to the admission of them
in evidence. If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer
serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose
complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsi-
ble for the wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding
the papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the
issue, as they unquestionably were. When papers are offered
in evidence, the court can take no notice how they were ob-
tained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a
collateral issue to determine that question. This point was
decided in the cases of Legatt v. Tollervey, . . . and Jordan v.
Lewis, .... ; and we are entirely satisfied that the principle
on which these cases were decided is sound and well estab-
lished. . . [T]herefore, we are of the opinion that the evi-
dence on the part of the Commonwealth was rightfully admit-
ted.
59
This famous passage is remarkable in several respects. First, it is
unadulterated dicta. Second, it is misleadingly worded. Because the
second sentence of the passage begins with "admitting," instead of,
as would be more proper, "assuming," the statement conveys the
impression that it sets forth the actual holding of the case rather than
dicta. 0 Third, the court's reliance on the two cited English
cases-Jordan v. East,"1 decided in 1740, and Legatt v. Tollervey,2
decided in 1811-was misplaced. Neither of these cases had decided
the broad question of whether a court could take notice of the manner
in which a given piece of evidence had been obtained. As was shown
above, the "common law rule" admitting improperly obtained evi-
dence in a civil or criminal case did not become generally recognized
in England until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 3 Jordan,
the first reported English case to deal with the admissibility of impro-
perly obtained evidence, had decided a rather narrow issue by hold-
ing that an improperly obtained copy of an indictment could be ad-
" Id. at 337-38.
See Note, Searches and Seizures-Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Wrongfully, 62 U. PA. L. REv. 721, 722 n.3 (1914).
61 93 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1740).
12 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (K.B. 1811).
"See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
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mitted into evidence in a malicious prosecution action. 4 The holding
in Legatt was similar.- Moreover, these cases did not furnish a direct
precedent on the issue of whether the government can prosecute for
crime by using evidence obtained in violation of constitutional pro-
tections. Although the court failed to mention it, Jordan and Legatt
plainly involved wrongfully, rather than illegally, obtained evidence,
and civil, rather than criminal cases.
Prior to Dana the English treatises and compilations on evidence
in general use in the United States contained no reference to the rule
of admissibility which the Dana court thought had been promulgated
in Jordan in 1740.66 Nor was such a rule mentioned in the first two
editions of Greenleaf's Treatise on the Law of Evidence."7 In the third
edition of this work, however, published five years after Dana in 1846,
a new section was inserted, which provided:
§ 254.a. It may be mentioned in this place, that though
papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally
taken from the possession of the party against whom they are
offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, there is no valid
objection to their admissibility, if they are pertinent to the
issue. The Court will not take notice how they were obtained,
whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to
determine that question. 8
In a footnote to the section, three cases were cited as authority:
Jordan, Legatt, and Dana. Although Greenleaf clearly was wrong in
asserting that these three cases had established a general rule of
admissibility for improperly obtained evidence, the new section was
included in the twelve subsequent editions of his Treatise, the last of
which was published in 1892.69 Because the Treatise was "[t]he
"The entire report of the Jordan case reads as follows:
The plaintiff and another were indicted at the Old Bailey for
forgery, and acquitted, and a copy of the indictment granted to the
other only. In this action, which was for a malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff offered the copy in evidence; and the order at the Old Bailey
was read by way of objection. But the Chief Justice said, he could not
refuse to let the plaintiff read it, for an order was not necessary to
make it evidence, nor is it ever produced in order to introduce it. So
it was read, and a verdict obtained for the plaintiff, which the Court
refused to set aside.
93 Eng. Rep. at 1072-73.
"See 104 Eng. Rep. at 617-19.
"Way, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26 TENN. L.REv. 332, 340 n. 28
(1959).
611d. at 340.
" 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254a (3d ed. 1846).
"Way, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26 TENN. L.Rav. 332, 340 (1959).
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major American work in the field of evidence published in the nine-
teenth century,"7 and "was used by American lawyers and judges for
over half a century,"'" Greenleaf's error found a large audience in the
United States during the last century. By the latter part of the nine-
teenth century the error had been accepted both by other evidence
writers72 and by a number of state courts." As a result, it became
generally accepted in this country that improperly obtained evidence
had been admissible at common law since at least 1740. Thus, when
it appeared in 1886, the Exclusionary Rule was thought by many to
have broken with a tradition nearly 150 years old.
In this century, the mistaken notion that improperly obtained
evidence was admissible at common law at an early date was re-
stated in the most renowned of all scholarly works on evidence law.
In the first edition of his monumental Treatise on Evidence, Dean
Wigmore stated flatly:
[I]t has long been established that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through
which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence. The
illegality is by no means condoned; it is merely ignored. .... .
In support of this statement, Wigmore quoted copiously from
three cases. The first was Dana; the second was an obscure 1875
Illinois decision upholding the admission, in a replevin proceeding,
of court records which a clerk improvidently had allowed to be re-
moved from his custody for use in a court in another county;7 and
the third was an 1897 Georgia case which had quoted Greenleaf's §
254.a in full.78 Wigmore's statement was repeated in all subsequent
editions of his influential work,77 and as a result it is widely believed
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24
(2d ed. 1872).
13 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897); Shields v. State,
104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894); Gindrat v. People, 138 fI1. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
74 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2183, at 2955 (1905).
1' Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513 (1875).
" Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897).
" 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 7 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 5 (3d ed. 1940); 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 626 (2d ed.
1923).
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today that long before the Exclusionary Rule originated there had
been rules permitting the use of improperly obtained evidence.
What could have motivated Wigmore to commit the egregious
error of perpetuating a myth? The answer lies in Wigmore's hostile
attitude toward the Exclusionary Rule, an attitude which has ironi-
cally but correctly been described as "an unfairness usually left to
demagogues, labor agitators and soap-box orators." '78 The Dean pas-
sionately disapproved of any rule of evidence, including the Exclu-
sionary Rule, which would shut out probative evidence on account of
the manner in which it had been obtained.79 As a result, the Dean
believed that the Exclusionary Rule was a piece of "misguided senti-
mentality" which coddled "the criminal classes of the population" '
because it hindered the efforts of prosecutorial officials to detect and
convict the guilty. Thus, in a famous article which appeared in the
American Bar Association Journal in 1922 and made apparent his
unscholarly hostility to the Exclusionary Rule, he ascribed the Rule
to "the temporarily recrudesence of individualistic sentimentality for
freedom of speech and conscience, stimulated by the stem repressive
war-measures against treason, disloyalty and anarchy, in the years
1917-1919."Il Wigmore then proceeded to make the following intem-
perate statements about the origins of the Rule:
In a certain type of mind, it was impossible to realize the
vital necessity of temporarily subordinating the exercise of or-
dinary civic freedom during a bloody struggle for national
safety and existence. In resistance to these war-measures, it
was natural for the misguided pacifist or semi-pro-German
interests to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus invoked and made prominent, all its ancient prestige was
revived and sentimentally misapplied: In such a situation, the
forces of criminality, fraud, anarchy, and law-evasion per-
ceived the advantage and made vigorous use of it. Since the
enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and its auxiliary
legislation, a new and popular occasion has been afforded for
the misplaced invocation of this principle; and the judicial
See also Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8
A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
"Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8 A.B.A.J. 646 (1922).
79 Id.
11 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2184, at 637 (2d ed. 1923).
R'Wignore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J.
479, 480 (1922).
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excesses of many Courts in sanctioning its use give an impres-
sion of maudlin complaisance which would be ludicrous if it
were not so dangerous to the general respect for law and order
in the community.82
Plainly, therefore, Wigmore's extraordinary dislike of the Exclusion-
ary Rule must have influenced his decision to perpetuate the histori-
cal error initially committed by the Dana court and later accepted
by Greenleaf.
II. THE COMPARATIVE ARGUMENT
The Comparative Argument attacks the Exclusionary Rule on the
grounds that the Rule is a uniquely American invention. According
to this argument, the undesirability of the Exclusionary Rule is dem-
onstrated by the Rule's lack of acceptance in other countries with
similar legal traditions. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in
Wolf v. Colorado" contains a succinct but explicit statement of the
argument:
When we find that in fact most of the English-speaking
world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion
of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this rem-
edy as an essential ingredient of the right.84
The argument may also be raised implicitly. One prominent critic of
the Exclusionary Rule, for example, recently made the following ob-
servation concerning the Rule:
Countries with whom we share many of our legal traditions,
such as England and Canada, do not make the admissibility
of evidence at a trial depend on how the evidence was ob-
tained."
The Comparative Argument is vulnerable to three criticisms.
First, the practices of other countries with a common law heritage are
only marginally relevant to the issue of the advisability of the Exclu-
sionary Rule. The explanation for this is rather simple and arises out
of the distinction between illegally and unlawfully obtained evidence
made at the beginning of this Article. There is an important differ-
ence between, on the one hand, excluding evidence because it was
obtained by exceeding constitutional restrictions on the exercise of
2 Id. at 480-81.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Id. at 29. Justice Frankfurter supported the Exclusionary Rule, but did not think
that it was constitutionally required. He made use of the Comparative Argument in
order to defend the decision in Wolf not to extend the Rule to the states.
"I Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV.
736 (1972). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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governmental power and, on the other hand, suppressing evidence
because it was obtained by violating statutory or common law limita-
tions on the power of the government. The Exclusionary Rule requires
suppression of evidence obtained by methods violative of a consti-
tutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; it says
nothing about the introduction of evidence obtained by infringing
lesser laws. In most common law jurisdictions there are no constitu-
tional rights because no written constitution protecting fundamental
freedoms exists, and the question of adopting the Exclusionary Rule
never arises.8" These countries have laid down rules dealing with the
admissibility of evidence improperly obtained by agents of govern-
ment, but the rules do not govern the use of evidence obtained by
invading constitutional rights. The rules are relevant to the debate
over the Exclusionary Rule only on the assumption that admitting
illegally obtained evidence can be equated with admitting unlawfully
obtained evidence. Stated differently, the practices of other common
law jurisdictions are relevant to the debate over the Exclusionary
Rule only if it is assumed that violating a constitutional provision is
equivalent to violating a provision of a statute or the common law.
Thus, practices in other common law countries may be of assistance
in determining whether to admit unlawfully obtained evidence, but
they cannot, except obliquely, throw light on the question of whether
to permit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence.
Second, even if it is assumed that other common law jurisdictions
have disapproved, or would disapprove ofthe Exclusionary Rule, it
does not follow as a matter of ineluctable logic that the Rule deserves
abolition. Whatever the practices of other countries may be, an argu-
ment can be made that several unique features of America's legal
system necessitate enforcement of a unique rule of evidence. There
is, for example, reason to believe that our legal system is more deeply
committed than others to the principle that government must respect
the privacy of the individual. Unlike most common law jurisdictions,
this country has enshrined the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure in a fundamental charter of government to insu-
late that right from the caprices of legislative bodies and the whims
of executive officials.' 7 Moreover, virtually all other countries with a
But see King v. Regina, [1968] 2 All E.R. 610 (P.C.) (Jamaica).
81 In England, for example, protection against governmental search and seizure
practices is wholly dependent upon statutory and common law. England has no
written constitution guaranteeing individual freedoms. W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE
CONSFnTurON 36-41, 255-79 (5th ed. 1959). England does have a Bill of Rights, but it
is a statute, repealable like any other statute. Moreover, it contains no protections
against unreasonable search and seizure. See 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
Like England, Scotland has no written constitution, and rights against unreason-
able search and seizure exist by virtue of statutory and common law. T. SMITH, A
SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 79-84, 207-19 (1962).
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common law background grant their police agencies powers of arrest,
search, and seizure which are far broader than those permitted in this
country." Another unique feature of our legal system is widespread
police corruption and abuse of power. Although the extent to which
police in other common law jurisdictions deviate from the rule of law
unquestionably has been underestimated, 9 it remains true that this
Canada does not have a written constitution. R. CHEFFINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS IN CANADA 1-60 (1969). Canada does have a Statutory Bill of Rights, see
[Can. Rev. Stat.] App. II (1970); but it contains no provisions on search and seizure
of things, although it does prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention of persons. More-
over, the Canadian Bill of Rights expressly provides that the Canadian Parliament
may, if it desires, enact legislation which will operate notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Bill of Rights. Id. See also Hudon, The British North America Act and
the Protection of Individual Rights: The Canadian Bill of Rights, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 273
(1975).
1 In England, for example, police officers, in certain cases, may issue search
warrants without resorting to a magistrate. L. LEIGH, POuCE POWERS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 167-96 (1975). Police officers in England also possess wide authority to seize
items without a search warrant. Id. Furthermore, because of terrorist activities by
underground political gangs of extremists, English and Northern Ireland police and
security forces have been vested with virtually unlimited authority to arrest suspected
terrorists, enter private homes, and search for and seize evidence and weapons. See,
e.g., Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974; Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973. See also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUN-
SELLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF
PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM, CMND. No. 4901 (1972); REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON 9TH AUGUST, 1971, CMND. No. 4823 (1971).
In Scotland, police may search a suspect's home without a search warrant when
the suspect has been charged with crime, H. M. Advocate v. M'Guigan, [1936] Scots
L.T.R. 161 (Ct. Just. 1935), or when the suspect is in custody but not formally charged,
McPherson v. H. M. Advocate [19721 Scots L.T.R. 71 (Ct. Just.).
In comparison with American police, Canadian police have "broader powers...
to search and seize". Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The
Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POL. Scl. & ADM. 36, 42
(1973). For example, Canadian police may search premises pursuant to a writ of
assistance. See Skinner, Writ of Assistance, 21 UNIV. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF L. REV.
26 (1963). Once issued by an Exchequer Court judge to a particular police officer, the
writ remains valid indefinitely and authorizes an unlimited number of entries into an
unlimited number of premises in order to conduct an unlimited number of searches.
Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort
Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POL. SCl. & ADM. 36, 41-42 (1973). Thus,
a Canadian writ of assistance is in effect a general search warrant and, as one critic of
the Exclusionary Rule has been forced to admit, "would be prohibited by the [United
States] Constitution." Id. at 41. It should be noted that opposition to the issuance to
quite similar writs of assistance in Massachusetts in the 1760's helped spark the Ameri-
can Revolution and later resulted in ratification of the fourth amendment. See N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (1973).
"g This is especially true for England, where it appears that police illegality is
far worse than popularly imagined. See, e.g., J. LAMBERT, CRIME, POLICE, AND RACE
RELATIONS (1970); S. BowEss, THE POLICE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, (1966); THE LAWYER'S
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country suffers from an unparallelled amount of police lawlessness."
Regardless of whether the Exclusionary Rule is appropriate in other
countries, these singular aspects of the American legal system may
well justify continued fidelity to the Rule in this country.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Comparative Argu-
ment, like the Historical Argument, is bottomed on an erroneous
premise. Just as the Historical Argument mistakenly presumes that
improperly obtained evidence was admissible at common law long
before the Exclusionary Rule appeared, so the Comparative Argu-
ment incorrectly assumes that other common law jurisdictions invari-
ably admit evidence improperly obtained by a governmental agent in
a criminal case. Yet the statutory and decisional law of these jurisdic-
tions is not so simple. While it is true that these jurisdictions do not
automatically exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, it is equally
true that they are willing, under appropriate circumstances, to sup-
press probative evidence of crime because of the procedures utilized
to obtain it.
To prove this point it is not necessary to recite the law in every
common law jurisdiction. It will be sufficient to examine the ap-
proaches toward admitting improperly obtained evidence taken in
three of the most important common law jurisdictions. Accordingly,
Subparts A through C will explore the degree to which improperly
obtained evidence is admissible in a criminal case in England, Scot-
land,9' and Canada.
A
The English rule that unlawfully obtained evidence was admissi-
ble in a criminal case was established in 1870.92 Around 1875 this rule
was absorbed by a broader rule which allowed the admission of all
RELEASE GROUP, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT? (M. King ed. 1973). See also FINAL
REPORT, ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE POLICE, CMND. No. 1728 (1962); REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE, CMND. No. 3293 (1929).
" See, e.g., P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER (1969); E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE
(1931); GOVERNMENT LAWLESSNESS IN AMERICA, (T. BECKER & V. MURRAY eds. 1971); W.
LA FARE, ARREST (1965); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF
CRIME (1967); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); J. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS
OF PROTEST (1969); WHO RULES THE POLICE? (L. Ruchelman ed. 1973); THE KNAPP
COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1973); R. STARK, POLICE RIOTS (1972).
" Scotland's legal system is a mixed one, blending both civil and common law
traditions. The reception of civil law occurred in the sixteenth century. Dunbar,
Lessons from Scottish Criminal Procedure, 2 TASM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964). See also T.
SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 19-24 (1962). Since 1707, when
Scotland united with England, Scotland has increasingly been influenced by English
statutory and common law. Id. For purposes of this article, Scotland is treated as a
common law jurisdiction because at present, fundamental liberties there, including
freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, rest on the common law. Id. at 79-84.
92 See notes 32-46 and accompanying text supra.
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improperly obtained evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding. 3 At
the present time neither of these nineteenth century rules governs
the use in a criminal case of evidence improperly obtained by an
agent of government. The modern rule allows use of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence, subject to the overriding discretion of the trial judge
to exclude it.94 Although the modern rule originated in a 1955 decision
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,95 it does not appear
ever to have resulted in the suppression of improperly obtained evi-
dence in a criminal case. 6 A 1968 decision of the Judicial Commit-
tee,97 however, together with dicta in a 1969 civil case,9" indicates that
"evidence obtained by the police in gross disregard of the accused's
rights is now excludable in English law."99
The modern rule was created in the appalling case of Kuruma v.
Regina.' The defendant, a colonial subject in British Kenya, was
charged in a Court of Emergency Assize at Nairobi with unauthorized
possession of two rounds of ammunition. The cartridges supposedly
had been found in the defendant's clothing by two colonial police
officers who unlawfully searched him. I"' Although the undisputed
facts indicated that the ammunition probably had been planted on
the defendant by the searching officers I"' and the three lay assessors
"1 The "common law rule" of admissibility was discussed at notes 21-29 and ac-
companying text supra.
"1 ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 700-02 (38th
ed. Butler & Mitchell 1973); Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence (1), 1973 CRIM. L.
REV. 603; R. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 480-81 (3d ed. 1972);
CRIMINAL LAw REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT, EVIDENCE (GENERAL) CMND. No.
4991 (1972); R. CRoss & N. WILKINs, AN OUTUNE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 172-74 (3d
ed. 1971).
Kuruma v. Regina, [1955] 1 All E.R. 236 (P.C.) (Kenya).
King v. Regina [1968] 2 All E.R. 610 (P.C.) (Jamaica). See also Regina v.
Keeton, 54 Crim. App. 267 (C.A. Crim. Div. 1970); Callis v. Gunn, [1963] 3 All E.R.
677 (Q.B.); Rumpling v. D.P.P., [19621 3 All E.R. 256 (H.L.). But compare Regina
v. Payne, [1963] 1 All E.R. 848 (Ct.Crim.App.); Regina v. Court, 1962 CRIM.L.REV.
697 (Ct. Crim. App.).
King v. Regina, [1968] 2 All E.R. 610 (P.C.) (Jamaica).
Ghani v. Jones, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1700 (C.A. Civ. Div.).
" Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Compara-
tive Study of a Classic Mismatch I, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1325, 1336 (1973).
' [1955] 1 All E.R. 236 (P.C.) (Kenya.).
" The search was unlawful because it had been conducted by colonial police
officers below the rank of assistant inspector. Id. at 238. A Kenyan Emergency Regula-
tion permitted searches to be made only by policemen of or above the rank of assistant
inspector. Id. at 237. The Regulation did not authorize low-ranking police officers to
search suspects because only "senior officers were sufficiently reliable to undertake
searches properly and to be trusted not to manufacture or plant evidence." Heydon,
Illegally Obtained Evidence (1), 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 603, 607.
102 As noted in note 101 supra, the search was made by police officers whose
testimony was not deemed sufficiently trustworthy to permit them to conduct
searches. Moreover, their testimony in this case was incredible. See Heydon, Illegally
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
participating in the trial voted to acquit, the magistrate convicted the
defendant and sentenced him to death. After the Court of Appeal for
Eastern Africa affirmed the conviction, leave to appeal to the Judicial
Committee was granted on the issue of whether the improperly ob-
tained cartridges ought to have been excluded by the trial court.
Although it was clear that the search of the defendant Was unlaw-
ful, the Judicial Committee, in an opinion by Lord Chief Justice
Goddard, merely assumed the unlawfulness of the search., 3 Working
on this assumption, the Judicial Committee then upheld the admissi-
bility of unlawfully obtained evidence in sweeping terms:
In their Lordships' opinion, the test to be applied in consid-
ering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant
to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court
is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained. While
this proposition may not have been stated in so many words
in any English case, there are decisions which support it and,
in their Lordships' opinion, it is plainly right in principle.', 4
This flat rule of inclusion was, however, immediately qualified:
No doubt in a criminal case the judge always has a discretion
to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissiblity would
operate unfairly against the accused. . .If, for instance, some
admission of some piece of evidence, e.g., a document, had
been obtained from a defendant by a trick, no doubt the judge
might properly rule it out."0 5
Upholding, as it did, the infliction of capital punishment on a
hapless colonial for a minor offense based on facts indicating that if
no unlawful search had occurred the case was a frame-up, Kuruma
is a dismaying decision. Kuruma is not, however, the latest
pronouncement of the Judicial Committee on the admissiblity of
unlawfully obtained evidence. In 1968 the Judicial Committee de-
livered the judgment in King v. Regina"'0 the only other twentieth
century English case to reach the issue on the merits.
King was an appeal from a marijuana possession conviction en-
tered in a Jamaican court. The defendant asked that his conviction
be quashed because the marijuana had been obtained improperly.
Lord Hodson's opinion for the Judicial Committee acknowledged the
Obtained Evidence (1), 1973 CraM. L. REV. 603, 606-07; Comment, 33 CAN.B.REv. 721,
722-23 (1955).
[1955] 1 All E.R. 236, 237-38 (P.C.) (Kenya).
' Id. at 239.
10 Id.
1' [1968] 2 All E.R. 610 (P.C.) (Jamaica).
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unlawfulness of the seizure of the marijuana. 7 The opinion also rec-
ognized that under Kuruma improperly obtained evidence could be
suppressed "if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly
against an accused."'0 8 However, apparently because the violation of
the defendant's rights by the police had been technical and insub-
stantial, the Judicial Committee declined to hold that the evidence
should have been excluded:
Having considered the evidence and the submissions ad-
vanced, their lordships hold that there is no ground for inter-
fering with the way in which the discretion has been exercised
in this case. This is not, in their opinion, a case in which
evidence has been obtained by conduct of which the Crown
ought not to take advantage. If they had thought otherwise,
they would have excluded the evidence even though tendered
for the suppression of crime.'
The words emphasized above appear to signify a new willingness
of the English courts to exclude unlawfully obtained criminal evi-
dence whenever the manner of obtaining the evidence involves a sub-
stantial denial of the accused's rights."0 In other words, the discre-
tionary power of a court to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence,
first defined in Kuruma, has been enlarged. In deciding whether to
exclude such evidence on grounds of fairness to the accused, the
emphasis is no longer on the presence or absence of trickery. Instead,
the English courts will now be more concerned with the degree of
police illegality. This interpretation of the language in King is bol-
stered by dicta in a 1969 case decided in the Court of Appeal (Civil
Division). In Ghani v. Jones"' Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls,
stated for the court:
" Id. at 612-13.
The search could not be justified by the search warrant held by the searching
police officers because the warrant was defective for two reasons: it failed to authorize
the search of persons (as opposed to places), and it was not directed to any named
constable. Id. The search could not be justified as a valid warrantless search under the
Jamaican Constabulary Force Law because it had not been conducted in the presence
of a magistrate. Id. at 613.
"I Id. at 615.
101 Id. at 617 (Emphasis added).
In affirming the conviction, the Judicial Committee also rejected the defendant's
contention that the court had no discretion to admit evidence obtained in violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights under the Jamaica Constitution, which was pro-
mulgated by The Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962. Id.
IO See Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Com-
parative Study of a Classic Mismatch I, 51 TEX. L. RFv. 1325, 1336 (1973).
" [19691 3 All E.R. 1700 (C.A. Civ. Div.).
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The common law does not permit police officers, or anyone
else, to ransack anyone's house, or to search for papers or arti-
cles therein, or to search his person, simply to see if he may
have committed some crime or other. If police officers should
so do, they would be guilty of a trespass. Even if they should
find something incriminating against him, I should have
thought that the court would not allow it to be used in evidence
against him, if the conduct of the police officers was so oppres-
sive that it would not be right to allow the Crown to rely on it;
see King v. Reginam .... "
At the present time, therefore, unlawfully obtained evidence is
subject to exclusion in an English criminal case if the trial court, in
the exercise of its discretion, determines that the methods used to
obtain the evidence substantially invaded the defendant's right to
privacy. Thus, current English practices do not support the Com-
parative Argument's assumption that unlawfully obtained evidence
is automatically admitted in a criminal case in other common law
countries, including England.
B
For more than twenty-five years the most important court of crim-
inal jurisdiction in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary,"3 has ad-
hered to a discretionary rule whereunder improperly obtained evi-
dence is inadmissible unless the methods used to obtain it are ex-
cused by the court." ' This rule is so firmly entrenched in the juris-
prudence of Scotland that the procedures followed in the event of an
objection based on the manner of obtaining evidence are quite similar
12 Id. at 1703.
" This court has both trial and appellate jurisdiction. Hardin, Other Answers:
Search and Seizure, Coerced Confession and Criminal Trial in Scotland, 113 U. PA.
L. REv., 165, 166 (1964). When its trial jurisdiction is exercised, the court consists of a
jury and normally one, but possibly as many as three, judges. T. SMiTH, A SHORT
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, 101 (1962). When it sits in its appellate capac-
ity, the High Court of Justiciary is the highest court in Scotland, and no appeals to
the House of Lords are permitted. Id. In appellate matters the court usually consists
of three judges, but in cases "of exceptional importance a Full Bench of [seven] judges
may sit to determine the law." Id.
"' See Gray, The Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained in Scotland, 1966
JURID. Ray. 89; Comment, Evidence Obtained by Means Considered Irregular, 1969
JuRID. REV. 55; Murray, Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 74 SCOT. L. REV.
73 (1958). See also Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal
Searches and Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L. REv. 523
(1952).
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to those followed in the United States when a motion to suppress is
filed.
115
Prior to 1949 the Scottish judiciary had not been required to de-
cide whether improperly obtained evidence was admissible in a crimi-
nal case."' The Scottish courts appear to have leaned toward a rule
of admissibility, since dicta in several criminal cases favored recep-
tion of all relevant evidence, regardless of the method by which it had
been obtained."7 When the issue came up for formal decision in 1949,
however, there was a remarkable change in attitude; and the view
that the mode of procuring evidence would not affect its admissibility
was rejected.
Lawrie v. Muir 5 "arose out of a triviality.""' 9 The defendant, a
shopkeeper, was charged with violating an administrative order by
possessing for business use thirty-one milk bottles which did not be-
long to her. The milk bottles were found in the defendant's shop by
two inspectors employed by a company formed to locate missing milk
containers and return them to their rightful owners. Under an agree-
ment between the inspectors' employer and the Scottish Milk Mar-
keting Board,the inspectors had the right to inspect the premises of
any producer or distributor of milk who had signed a contract with
the Marketing Board allowing these inspections. Since the defendant
had not entered into a contract with the Marketing Board, the inspec-
tors' search of her shop was without legal foundation. Despite, how-
ever, the unauthorized behavior of the inspectors, the trial court over-
ruled the defendant's objection to the evidence of the milk bottles,
and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to pay a nominal
fine.
,,5 The Scottish procedures are described in A. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND 4 (1964). For a High Court of Justiciary trial proceeding in
which the procedures were followed, see H.M. Advocate v. Turnbull, [1951] Scots
L.T.R. 409 (Ct. Just.).
"6 MURRAY, Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 74 SCOT. L. Rzv. 73
(1958). See also Gray, The Admissiblity of Evidence Illegally Obtained in Scotland,
1966 JURID. REV. 89.
,7 See, e.g., H.M. Advocate v. M'Guigan, [1936] Scots L.T.R. 161 (Ct. Just.
1935); Adair v. M'Garry, [1931] Scots L.T.R. 482 (Ct. Just.); Crook v. Duncan, 6
Scots L.T.R. 292 (Ct. Just. 1899). See also Watson v. Muir, [1939] Scots L.T.R. 14
(Ct. Just. 1938); Pringle v. Bremmer, 5 MacPherson 55, 5 Scots Rev. Rep. 50 (H.L.
Scot. 1867). But compare Jackson v. Stevenson, 4 Scots L.T.R. 277 (Ct. Just. 1897).
In several civil cases decided prior to 1949 the admissibility of wrongfully obtained
evidence was upheld. E.g., Maccoll v. Maccoll, [1946] Scots L.T.R. 312 (Ct. Sess.);
Rattray v. Rattray, 5 Scots L.T.R. 245 (Ct. Sess. 1897).
I's [1950] Scots L.T.R. 37 (Ct. Just. 1949).
"'Murray, Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 74 SCOT. L. REV. 73
(1958).
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant as-
serted that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because all impro-
perly obtained evidence was inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. '
The prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that relevant evidence
of crime could not be excluded simply because of how it had been
obtained.' 2 ' Squarely confronting the issue of the admissibility of
improperly obtained evidence in a criminal trial for the first time, the
Full Bench of the High Court of Justiciary, in a unanimous opinion
by Lord Justice-General Cooper,'1 refused to accept either the rigid
rule of exclusion proposed by the defendant or the rigid rule of inclu-
sion suggested by the prosecutor. Any rule operating inflexibly to
exclude or admit improperly obtained but probative evidence would,
the court stated, be unsatisfactory:
From the standpoint of principle it seems to me that the
law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests
which are liable to come into conflict-(a) the interest of
the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions
of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of
the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the com-
mission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done
shall not be withheld from Courts of law on any merely
formal or technical ground. Neither of these objects can be
insisted upon to the uttermost. The protection of the citizen
is primarily protection for the innocent citizen against un-
warranted, wrongful and perhaps high-handed interference,
and the common sanction is an action of damages. The
protection is not intended as a protection for the guilty
citizen against the efforts of the public prosecutor to vindi-
cate the law. On the other hand the interest of the State
cannot be magnified to the point of causing all the safeguards
for the protection of the citizen to vanish, and of offering a
positive inducement to the authorities to proceed by irregular
methods. It is obvious that excessively rigid rules as to the
exclusion of evidence bearing upon the commission of a crime
might conceivably operate to the detriment and not the advan-
tage of the accused, and might even lead to the conviction of
the innocent; and extreme cases can easily be figured in which
'2 [1950] Scot L.T.R. at 38.
121 Id.
'22 Lord Justice-General Cooper has been described as a man "whose pre-eminent
reputation as a judge commands especial respect." Gray, The Admissibility of Evi-
dence Illegally Obtained in Scotland, 1966 JURID. REv. 89, 92.
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the exclusion of a vital piece of evidence from the knowledge
of a jury because of some technical flaw in the conduct of the
police would be an outrage upon common sense and a defiance
of elementary justice.
1 3
Since, by this logic, principles of justice forbid strict rules of ex-
clusion or inclusion, the "true rule,' ' 24 according to the court, con-
sisted of a rule of discretion under which fairness to -the accused
would be balanced with the state's interest in punishing the guilty.
The admissibility of improperly obtained evidence would therefore
depend on whether, considering the circumstances of the search and
the nature of the case, the methods used to obtain the evidence can
be "excused" by the court:
Irregularities required to be excused, and infringements of
the formalities of the law in relation to these matters are not
lightly to be condoned. Whether any given irregularity ought
to be excused depends upon the nature of the irregularity and
the circumstances under which it was committed. In particu-
lar, the case may bring into play the discretionary principle of
fairness to the accused which has been developed so fully in our
law in relation to the admission in evidence of confessions or
admissions by a person suspected or charged with crime. That
principle would obviously require consideration in any case in
which the departure from the strict procedure had been
adopted deliberately with a view to securing the admission of
evidence obtained by an unfair trick. Again, there are many
statutory offenses in relation to which Parliament has pre-
scribed in detail in the interests of fairness a special procedure
to be followed in obtaining evidence; and in such cases (of
which the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts provide one example)
it is very easy to see why a departure from the strict rules has
often been held to be fatal to the prosecution's case. On the
other hand, to take an extreme instance figured in argument,
it would usually be wrong to exclude some highly incriminat-
ing production in a murder trial merely because it was found
by a police officer in the course of a search authorized for a
different purpose or before a proper warrant had been ob-
tained. 25




Applying the rule of discretion to this particular case, the court
concluded that the objectionable evidence should not have been in-
troduced and accordingly quashed the conviction.' 6 It appears that
the limited authority of the inspectors was crucial in arriving at the
decision to exclude the evidence. The court stated:
[P]ersons in the special position of these inspectors ought to
know the precise limits of their authority and should be held
to exceed these limits at their peril. It is found that the inspec-
tors acted in good faith, but it is incontrovertible that they
obtained the assent of the appellant to the search of her shop
by means of a positive misrepresentation made to her.'1
The evidence excluded in Lawrie had been located by private
parties. Thus, while the decision certainly determined that wrong-
fully obtained evidence was excludable in a Scottish criminal case,
it by no means settled the issue of the admissibility of unlawfully
obtained evidence. Less than a year after Lawrie, however, the High
Court of Justiciary extended the rule of discretion to evidence impro-
perly obtained by an agent of government.
In M'Govern v. H. M. Advocate'28 the defendant had been con-
victed of burglary and safecracking on the basis of a long chain of
circumstantial evidence, including scrapings taken by police from
under the defendant's fingernails. The prosecutor conceded that, be-
cause they had been taken without either consent or a search warrant,
the scrapings had been improperly obtained. He argued, nonetheless,
that the scrapings had been properly admitted because their seizure
had been excusable. The court declined to excuse the failure of the
police to secure a search warrant and quashed the conviction.' 29 Again
speaking through Lord Justice-General Cooper, the court explained
its decision in these words:
This is not a case where I feel disposed to "excuse" the conduct
of the police. The proper procedure for search of the appel-
lant's house by obtaining a search warrant was duly followed
out, and it would have been very simple for the police to have
adopted the appropriate procedure in relation to a search of his
person. Why they did not do so, we do not yet know. Exactly
the same information was available to them when they scraped
the appellant's fingernails as when they charged and appre-
'id.
12id.
"2 [1950] Scots L.T.R. 133 (Ct.Just.)
1id. at 135.
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hended him shortly afterwards; and, if the charge and appre-
hension were justified, these should have preceded and not
followed the examination of his person. 3 '
In the quarter-century since Lawrie and M'Govern, the High
Court of Justiciary has decided relatively few cases in which the
defendant has raised the claim that evidence used against him should
have been excluded because of the method by which it was obtained.
And in almost all of these cases the search and seizure was deter-
mined to be lawful, and thus it was unnecessary to apply the rule of
discretion.' In only two cases has the court found it necessary to
decide whether to excuse an unlawful search and seizure.
In Fairley v. Fishmongers of London,3 2 the court upheld a convic-
tion for possession of unclean salmon. An inspector employed by a
private company and an inspector from the Ministry of Food had
discovered the salmon during a search of cold storage facilities. Al-
though the search was unlawful because the inspectors lacked a
search warrant, the court, speaking through Lord Justice-General
Cooper, excused it because of the good faith of the inspectors and the
absence on their part of any intention of "securing the admission of




In H.M. Advocate v. Turnbull, 34 a different result was reached.
Turnbull was a trial rather than an appellate proceeding. The defen-
dant, charged with fraud and attempted fraud, objected to the ad-
missibility of certain documents seized under a search warrant. Al-
though the search warrant did not authorize the seizure, these docu-
ments, along with others specified in the warrant, were carried off by
police executing the search warrant. When at a later date the police
realized that they had taken documents to which they were not enti-
tled, they nonetheless kept and examined them in order to discover
evidence of additional crimes. The charges of fraud and attempted
fraud arose directly out of the examination of the documents illegally
taken and kept by the police. Under these circumstances, the court,
exercising the Lawrie balancing test, ordered the evidence
suppressed. '35
130 Id.
'"' See, e.g., McPherson v. H.M. Advocate, [1972] Scots L.T.R. 71 (Ct. Just.);
Bell v. Hogg, [1967] Scots L.T.R. 290 (Ct. Just.); H.M. Advocate v. Hepper, [19581
Scots L.T.R. 160 (Ct. Just.).
'31 [1951] Scots L.T.R. 54 (Ct. Just. 1950).
" Id. at 58.
'3' [1951] Scots L.T.R. 409 (Ct. Just.). See also Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate,
[1954] Scots L.T.R. 177 (Ct. Just.).
11 The court explained its judgment in these words:
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Like England, therefore, Scotland provides no support for the
proposition, implicit in the Comparative Argument, that unlawfully
obtained evidence is not excludable in other countries with a common
law heritage.
C
At the present time, Canadian courts follow a judge-made rule
under which relevant evidence of crime cannot be suppressed because
it was improperly obtained. 3 Over the past few years, however, sup-
port for excluding such evidence has been growing in Canada. The
trend also supports excluding improperly obtained evidence in a civil
action.
In the years preceding 1955, the courts of Canada's provinces
followed a rule which neither required nor permitted the exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal case.'37 As a result,
In the present case there were, first, no circumstances of urgency.
Second, the retention and use over a period of six months of the
documents bearing to relate to other matters than that mentioned in
the petition show that the actions complained of were deliberate. The
police officers did not accidentally stumble upon evidence of a plainly
incriminating character in the course of a search for a different pur-
pose. If the documents are incriminating, their incriminating charac-
ter is only exposed by careful consideration of their contents. Third,
if information was in the hands of other crimes, these could have been
mentioned in the petition containing the warrant under which the
search was authorized. If they had no such information, the examina-
tion of private papers in the hope of finding incriminating material
was interference with the rights of a citizen. Therefore to hold that
evidence so obtained was admissible would, as I have said, tend to
nullify the protection afforded to a citizen by the requirements of a
magistrate's warrant, and would offer a positive inducement to the
authorities to proceed by irregular methods. Fourth, when I consider
the matter in the light of the principle of fairness to the accused, it
appears to me that the evidence so irregularly and deliberately ob-
tained is intended to be the basis of a comparison between the figures
actually submitted to the Inspector. of Taxes and the information in
the possession of the accused. If sdch important evidence upon a num-
ber of charges is tainted by the method by which it was deliberately
secured, I am of opinion that a fair trial upon these charges is rendered
impossible.
Accordingly, when I apply the principles to be derived from the
authorities to the facts of this case, I am driven to the conclusion that
the objection taken to the admissibility of the documents is well
founded. I shall therefore sustain the objection.
[1951] Scots L.T.R. at 411-12.
116 See Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches: The Cana-
dian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POL. Sci. & ADM. 36 (1973).
in CANADIAN CRmuNAL EVIDENCE 521-22 (Popple 2d ed. 1954); Cowen, The Admis-
sibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches and Seizures in British Coin-
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between 1886 and 1955 these courts repeatedly upheld the admissi-
bility of such evidence, frequently in the context of a prosecution for
a liquor offense.'38 The Kuruma decision in 1955 created the possi-
bility that Canadian courts would abandon the stringent rule of in-
clusion and replace it with a rule permitting exclusion of unlawfully
obtained evidence whenever its admission would operate unfairly
against the accused.'39 It shortly became clear, however, that the
provincial courts had no intention of modifying their rule. 40 More-
over, less than a year after Kuruma was announced, the Supreme
Court of Canada indicated that it would follow the provincial rule.",
Thereafter, Regina v. Wray, 42 decided in 1970, laid to rest any
doubt concerning whether the Canadian courts would adhere to the
rule of inclusion followed in the provincial courts since 1886.
In Wray, the defendant, on trial for noncapital murder, was given
a directed verdict of acquittal after the trial judge suppressed an
involuntary statement extracted from the defendant by the police.
The prosecution appealed, claiming that the order of suppression was
erroneous insofar as it extended to the portions of the statement
subsequently corroborated by recovery of the murder weapon. A prov-
incial appellate court affirmed, holding that:
In our view, a trial judge has a discretion to reject evidence,
even of substantial weight, if he considers that its admission
would be unjust or unfair to the accused or calculated to bring
the administration of justice into disrepute, the exercise of
such discretion, of course, to depend upon the particular facts
before him. Cases where to admit certain evidence would be
monwealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L. REV. 523, 540-41, (1952); Comment, 33 CAN. B.
REV. 721 (1955); G. MARTIN, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AROUND THE WORLD-CANADA, IN
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 104 (Sowle ed. 1962).
lu See, e.g., Regina v. Baker, 102 C.C.C. 295 (Ont. D.C. 1952); Rex v. Lee Hai,
64 C.C.C. 49 (Man. C.A. 1935); Rex v. Duroussel, 59 C.C.C. 263 (Man. C.A. 1933);
Rex v. Kostachuk, 54 C.C.C. 189 (Sask. C.A. 1930); Rex v. Wright, 52 C.C.C. 285
(Edm. D.C. 1929); Rex v. Hawkins, 42 C.C.C. 305 (Que. K.B. 1923); Rex v. Nelson,
37 C.C.C. 270 (Alb.S.Ct. 1922); Rex v. Moore, 37 C.C.C. 72 (Alb.S.Ct. 1922); Rex v.
Gibson, 30 C.C.C. 308 (Alb.S.Ct. 1919); Rex v. Swarts, 27 C.C.C. 90 (Ont.S.Ct. 1916);
Rex v. Honan, 20 C.C.C. 10 (Ont. C.A. 1912); Ex parte Dewar, 15 C.C.C. 273 (N.B.S.
Ct. 1909); Ex parte Wilson, 15 C.C.C. 264 (N.B.S.Ct. 1908); Regina v. Doyle, 12 Ont.
347 (Ont. Q.B. 1886). But see Rex v. Ollassoff, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 830 (Sask.D.C. 1929);
Ex parte McCleave, 5 C.C.C. 115 (N.B.S.Ct. 1900).
13'See Comment, 33 CAN. B. REV. 721 (1955).
"'See, e.g., Regina v. Foil, 117 C.C.C. 19 (Man.Q.B. 1956). But compare Regina
v. Steinberg, [1967] 1 Ont. 733 (Ont. C.A.).
"'See A.-G. of Quebec v. Begin, 112 C.C.C. 209 (Can.S.Ct. 1955).
142[19701 4 C.C.C. 1 (Can.S.Ct.).
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calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute
will be rare, but we think the discretion of a trial Judge extends
to such cases.' 3
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada set aside the
suppression order and directed a new trial.'44 Six members of the
court, speaking through an opinion written by Justice Martland, re-
jected the notion that a Canadian court possesses discretion to disal-
low relevant evidence because of the manner in which it was ob-
tained. 4 5 In the court's view, probative evidence of crime can never
operate unfairly against an accused merely because it was obtained
by improper methods:
This development of the idea of a general discretion to
exclude admissible evidence is not warranted by the authority
on which it purports to be based. The dictum of Lord Goddard,
in the Kuruma case has been unduly extended . . . It recog-
nized a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of
admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused. Even
if this statement be accepted, in the way in which it is phrased,
the exercise of a discretion by the trial Judge arises only if the
admission of the evidence would operate unfairly. The allow-
ance of admissible evidence relevant to the issue before the
Court and of substantial probative value may operate unfor-
tunately for the accused, but not unfairly. It is only the allow-
ance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admis-
sibility of which is tenuous, and whose probative force in rela-
tion to the main issue before the Court is trifling, which can
be said to operate unfairly. 4 '
Although this statement was made in connection with the deci-
sion on whether an involuntary confession is admissible to the extent
that it has been verified by tangible evidence, the implications of
Wray are far-reaching.'47 Wray has fixed the rule that nothing in the
Bill of Rights or the common law of Canada invests a judge with
authority to exclude relevant evidence because it was improperly
obtained by a government official.'48
" Regina v. Wray, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 122, 123 (Ont.C.A. 1969).
Regina v. Wray, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (Can.S.Ct.)
11d. at 12-19.
"11Id. at 17.
"'See Sheppard, Restricting the Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence, An
Examination of Regina v. Wray, 14 CPlM. L.Q. 334 (1971).
1I8d.
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Despite the holding in Wray, recent years have witnessed the
growth in Canada of a discernible trend in favor of excluding impro-
perly obtained evidence in both civil and criminal cases under certain
circumstances. This trend, which may be traced back to a 1963 Cana-
dian legal article recommending that Canadian courts refuse to
admit such evidence,'49 has manifested itself in two ways. First, sev-
eral reports in favor of exclusion have been released under the aus-
pices of the government of Canada. In 1968, Pierre Trudeau, then
Minister of Justice, issued a white paper. The contents of this docu-
ment, entitled A Canadian Charter of Human Rights,5" have been
summarized in these words:
The white paper called attention to the limited scope of
human rights protections in Canada at that time and recom-
mended several additional guarantees. The white paper noted
that several countries have constitutional provisions that em-
phasize the protection of the private home. It pointed out that
Canadian courts admit all products of unreasonable and even
illegal searches. Finally, the paper suggested that illegally ob-
tained evidence should be as inadmissible as an illegally ob-
tained confession. 51
Although the white paper's recommendation did not escape criti-
cism, 15 a year later the Canadian Commission on Corrections issued
a report which also supported exclusion of improperly obtained evi-
dence.'53 Because it believed that "the state's use of evidence ob-
tained through deliberate violation of the accused's rights may reduce
the chances for the offender's rehabilitation,' '5 4 the Commission rec-
ommended enactment of legislation based on these principles:
1. The court may in its discretion reject evidence which has
been illegally obtained.
2. The court in exercising its discretion to either reject or admit
evidence which has been illegally obtained shall take into con-
sideration the following factors:
"'Skinner, Writ of Assistance, 21 UNIV. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF L. Rlv. 26 (1963).
See also Comment, 33 CAN. B. Rv. 72 (1955).
"50P. TRUDEAU, A CANADIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RiGHTs (1968).
"1'Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative
Study of a Classic Mismatch I, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1325, 1340 (1973).
'1Id. at 134-41. See also Chitty, Evidence Wrongfully Obtained, 17 CHrrry's L.J.
17 (1969).




(i) Whether the violation of rights was wilful, or whether
it occurred as a result of inadvertence, mistake, igno-
rance, or error in judgment.
(ii) Whether there existed a situation of urgency in order
to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence, or other
circumstances which in the particular case justified the
action taken.
(iii) Whether the admission of the evidence in question
would be unfair to the accused.
3. The legislation should provide that the discretion to reject
evidence illegally obtained provided for by such legislation
does not affect the discretion which a court now has to disallow
evidence if the strict rules of evidence would operate unfairly
against an accused.'55
The Canadian trend toward exclusion has also manifested itself
in recent provincial and federal legislation. In July 1970, for example,
Manitoba enacted a Privacy Act.'5' The Act defines the tort of viola-
tion of privacy and authorizes civil actions against those who commit
the tort.' 57 Section 7 of the Act directs the suppression in civil actions
of evidence obtained by committing the tort of violation of privacy:
From and after the coming into force of this Act, no evidence
obtained by virtue or in consequence of a violation of privacy
in respect of which an action may be brought under this Act
is admissible in any civil proceedings.' 8
More recently, in January 1974, the Canadian Parliament enacted
a comprehensive statute governing electronic interception of private
communications. Section 2 of the Protection of Privacy Act ' adds a
new section 178.16 to the Canadian Criminal Code. Subsection 1 of
this section provides that an unlawfully intercepted private commu-
nication, as well as the fruits thereof, shall be inadmissible in evi-
dence against the parties to the conversation.' 0 Subsection 2 confers
'Id. at 74-75. The Committee's proposal has not gone without criticism. See
Mewett, Law Enforcement and Conflict of Values, 12 CRIM. L.Q. 179 (1970).
'IS.M. 1970, c. 74.
'571d. at § 2.
'id. at § 7.
'5 'Protection of Privacy Act 1974, c. 50, § 2 (Can.).
1w A private communication that has been intercepted and evidence
obtained directly or indirectly as a result of information acquired by
interception of a private communication are both inadmissible as evi-
dence against the originator thereof or the person intended by the
originator thereof to receive it unless
1975]
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on judges a limited discretion to admit certain evidence which other-
wise would be excluded by subsection 1.111 In particular, subsection
2 authorizes the judge, if he wishes, to allow the introduction of an
unlawfully intercepted private communication or the fruits thereof,
provided that the evidence is excludable under subsection I solely for
technical reasons. Moreover, the subsection permits a judge to admit
the fruits of an unlawfully intercepted private communication (but
not the communication itself) when admission is imperative in order
for justice to be done. Under the third subsection of section 178.16,
subsection 1 is made applicable to all criminal proceedings in Canada
and to all civil proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Canadian
Parliament. 6 2 In Canada, therefore, some evidence of crime obtained
by unlawful electronic surveillance is inadmissible, and support for
a general rule of exclusion for improperly obtained evidence appears
to be growing.
Conclusion
Two arguments often raised in opposition to the Exclusionary
Rule are without merit. One of the principal defects of the Historical
Argument is its mistaken assumption that the Rule is a departure
from traditional practices. In actuality, the rules permitting intro-
duction of improperly obtained evidence were creatures of the nine-
teenth century and preceded the Exclusionary Rule by a relatively
short period of time. Quite apart from its other weaknesses, the Com-
parative Argument is unpersuasive because it rests on the erroneous
(a) the intereception was lawfully made; or
(b) the originator of the private communication or the person intended
by the originator thereof to receive it has expressly consented to the
admission thereof.
Can. Rev. Stat., c. C-34, §17-8.16(1) (1974).
"'Where in any proceedings the judge is of the opinion that any
private communication or any other evidence that is inadmissible
pursuant to subsection (1)
(a) is relevant, and
(b) is inadmissible by reason only of a defect of form or an irregularity
in procedure, not being a substantive defect or irregularity, in the
application for or the giving of the authorization under which such
private communication was intercepted or by means of which such
evidence was obtained, or
(c) that, in the case of evidence, other than the private communica-
tion itself, to exclude it as evidence may result in justice not being
done, he may, notwithstanding subsection (1), admit such private
communication or evidence as evidence in such proceedings.
Id. at § 178.16(2) (1974).
162 Subsection (1) applies to all criminal proceedings and to all civil pro-
ceedings and other matters whatever respecting which the Parliament
of Canada has jurisdiction.
Id. at § 178.16(3) (1974).
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assumption that other countries with a common law tradition ignore
the method of obtaining in determining whether to admit probative
evidence. Examination of the practices in England, Scotland, and
Canada, however, indicates that other common law jurisdictions do
suppress evidence of crime when it was improperly obtained.
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